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Utah Code Annotated § ?S-18;i • i iKl)[a) and 78-2a-3< 2)(j) (Supp 2Uo i).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

' ""Alulliti llir Uiiil

iiii ion n i h 'vnHiiilrH ir i matter of fact and law that

defendant was unlawMly detained by officers who had v alidly executed an, arrest warrant
Ioi mi. it'lii• m<li\iiliml.

•

.

A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue, I Jnderlying factual,, findings
JII" di/tneiitially, ,im! teverseil mil"" ' I'm 'Ylrnr rrror<n Hie court's conclusions of law,
howevei; are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards
- -d standards lo the facts. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah

CONTROLLING STATUTORY P R O V I S I O N S
'fir followiiij , i onstitulKMial provision is determinative of this issue:

United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The State of Utah appeals from the order of dismissal and order of suppression of

the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Fourth District Court.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Defendant, Tracy Manuel Valdez, was charged with possession of

methamphetamine in a drug free zone with a prior conviction, possession of paraphernalia
in a drug free zone, and giving false personal information to a peace officer. (R. 14).
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all charges. (R. 16-17).
The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the case.
(R. 51-54, 56-57). The State timely appealed the trial court's ruling. (R. 62). The Utah
Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. (R. 70).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. On February 26, 2001, Officer Bryan Robinson, accompanied by a fellow
officer, went to the home of Monique Young on Thornberry Avenue in Pleasant Grove to
carry out a valid warrant for her arrest. (R. 71:5, 7).
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2. Officer Robinson knocked on the door. Monique Young answered, and Officer
Robinson informed her that she was under arrest. Because she was wearing boxer shorts
at the time, she asked to be allowed to put on a pair of pants, which were back in her
bedroom. Officer Robinson agreed, and escorted her with another officer to the bedroom.
(R. 71: 5-7).
3. Once in the bedroom, Officer Robinson noticed a male lying face down on the
bed, covered with blankets or a coat. (R. 71: 6). Officer Robinson assumed the male was
sleeping. (R. 71: 15-16). Officer Robinson couldn't see the male's hands because they
were covered by his body or by a blanket or by a coat while he slept. (R. 71: 15).
Officer Robinson yelled at the male to "Wake up. Let me see your hands." (R. 71: 6, 1516). When the male did not awake, Officer Robinson shook the male and the bed yelling,
"Wake up. I need to see your hands." (R. 71: 6). Officer Robinson testified "At that
point he [the male] kind of gets up and wakes up I would say." (R. 71: 6).
4. After the male was awake, Officer Robinson asked for identification, which the
man stated he did not have. (R. 71: 7). He then asked for the man's name and birth date,
to which the man responded with the name of Sean Tracy Michaels and a date of birth of
December 4, 1961. (R. 71: 7). Officer Robinson ran the warrants and an NCI check on
that individual. (R. 71: 7). During that time, Officer Robinson overheard Monique
Young whispering to the assisting officer that the man's true name was Tracy Valdez so
Officer Robinson then advised dispatch Tracy Valdez with the date of birth he gave him.
(R. 71: 7, 8). Dispatch came back with a valid statewide warrant for Tracy Valdez with a
different date of birth of December 3, 1961 instead of December 4, 1961. (R. 71: 8).

3

5. Officer Robinson at that point again asked the man for identification to which
the man responded by producing a Utah identification card bearing the name of Tracy
Manuel Valdez. (R. 71: 8).
6. Valdez was handcuffed and placed under arrest and led out to a patrol car
where he was patted down, searched, whereby Officer Robinson discovered the
methamphetamine and paraphernalia hidden in his belt. (R. 71: 8, 9).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded, based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, that Officer Robinson's encounter with
Defendant was a level two encounter, and that the officer's actions in asking for
defendant's identification, name and date of birth and then running a warrants check after
any fears for officer safety, if any existed, had dissipated, exceeded the permissible length
and scope of detention and was therefore violative of Defendant's Fourth Amendment
right to befreefromunreasonable searches and seizures.
Further, because this Court can affirm on any ground presented to the trial court,
this Court can and should conclude that under the circumstances, that of a solitary male,
asleep on a bed with two officers accompanying another individual under arrest while she
retrieved an item of clothing, that any fears the officers had that Defendant might be
armed and dangerous were unjustified and therefore the level two detention of Defendant
was per se unreasonable and cannot be justified.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE FAILS TO SHOW THAT WHEN VIEWING
THE EVIDENCE AND ALL THE REASONABLE INFERENCES
THAT CAN BE DRAWN THEREFROM IN A LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING,
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
The trial court correctly concluded, based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, that any fears Officer Robinson may have
reasonably had regarding officer safety had dissipated and therefore his actions of asking
for defendant's identification, name and date of birth and then running a warrants check
after were beyond the permissible length and scope of detention and were therefore
violative of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
The State seeks to have the trial courts factual findings reversed on this point
asserting that they are clearly erroneous. In making this assertion, however, the State
fails to adequately marshall the evidence and to consider it and all the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
Pertinent case law provides that "a trial court's factual findings will not be reversed
absent clear error." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^[60 28 P.3d 1278. Further, to
adequately demonstrate that a finding of fact is a "clear error," the complaining party
"must first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. After
marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is
insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, \\1
n.2.3dll08.
5

The trial court found that "[a]fter the officers could see Defendant's hands and
[k]new they were in no danger, the detention should have ended." (R. 52). The
preliminary hearing testimony on this point between Officer Robinson and the State on
direct examination reads:
Q: You went back to a bedroom and you say you saw a male on the bed?
A: Correct.
Q: Describe what you saw?
A: There was a male laying face down. I can't remember if it was a coat or
blankets that were over him. I couldn't see his hands. That was a concern
for me. So I yelled at him, you know, "Wake up. Let me see your hands."
He wasn't responsive. I remember shaking him and shaking the bed.
"Wake up. I need to see your hands." At that point he kind of gets up and
wakes up I would say.
Mr. Buhman: Did you place him into custody?
Officer Robinson: Not at that time.
Mr. Buhman: Who was that male?
Officer Robinson: I asked him if he had any identification on him. He
stated that he did not. I asked him for his name. He gave the name of Sean
Tracy Michaels.
(R. 71: 6, 7).
The State asserts that based on this evidence that trial court's finding that the
officers could see defendant's hands was clearly erroneous. However, reading the above
dialogue, and considering the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it and the
totality of the circumstances, indicate that the trial court's finding was reasonable and not
"clear error."
It was reasonable for the court to infer from the testimony and circumstances that
defendant's hands were either visible to the officers and/or that any concerns they had
about their safety should have dissipated when defendant "kind of gets up and wakes up."
6

(R. 71: 6). Defendant's actions of waking up and getting up were in response to the
officer's yelling for him to show his hands multiple times and shaking him and the bed.
The court therefore likely and reasonably inferred that when the officer testified that
defendant "kind of gets up and wakes up I would say," that his hands had then become
visible. When a person wakes up and gets up he/she customarily will sit and/or stand up
thus making his/her hands visible.
It is also reasonable for the court to infer that because the officer said nothing
further about defendant's hands not being visible after being so adamant on that point,
that the opposite was true. There is no testimony elicited from the State or volunteered
by Officer Robinson that after defendant "gets up and wakes up" that his hands were still
not visible as would have been expected and reasonable had that been the case.
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances and the reasonable
inferences that the court could draw from the evidence, the finding that the officers could
see defendant's hands and knew they were in no danger was likely correct and at the very
least certainly not "clear error."
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CONTINUED
DETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF DEFENDANT AFTER HIS
HANDS WERE VISIBLE EXCEEDED ANY PERMISSIBLE LENGTH AND
SCOPE OF DETENTION AND WAS THEREFORE VIOLATIVE OF
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The trial court correctly concluded that after the officers could see defendant's
hands and knew they were in no danger, the detention should have ended. It is wellestablished that a police officer may detain and question an individual "when the officer
has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). It is also
7

well-established that any detention of a person after an initial lawful stop must be
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761. 762 (Utah 1991).
In the case at bar the trial court correctly concluded that the continued detention of
defendant for questioning exceeded the permissible scope and was therefore violative of
Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court concluded that the officers were justified,
because of officer safety concerns, to awaken defendant to view his hands when they
encountered him sleeping in the room where a third party currently under arrest was
retrieving an item of clothing. The trial court also concluded that the actions of waking
the defendant in a private residence by shaking him and the bed in which he slept
amounted to a level two encounter.1
Based on these conclusions, the court's reasoned that because defendant was
detained for the limited purpose of ensuring officer safety, and because it amounted to a
level two detention, once the defendant woke up and got up and his hands were likely
visible, any safety concerns of the officers should have been alleviated and the detention
of defendant should have ended. The officers were only to be present in the room for
what should have been a very short period of time to allow an arrested third party to
retrieve some pants. (R. 71: 6). There were two officers present with no indication the
third party was not being cooperative and the situation was apparently well in hand. (R.
71:6, 7). The defendant they found in the room was found and assumed by Officer
Robinson to be sleeping. (R. 71: 15, 16). The officer's only apparent concern was not
being able to see defendant's hands because they were covered by his body or by a

1

It should be noted that the State does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that the
officer's actions and surrounding circumstances constitute a level two detention.
8

blanket or a coat. (R. 71: 15). Rather than allowing the defendant to peacefully sleep
during the presumably minute or two it would have taken for the cooperative arrested
individual to retrieve her pants, the officer decided to likely prolong the time in the room
by waking the defendant to see his hands.
The trial, court found, as discussed in Point I above, that once defendant awake and
got up, that his hands were likely visible and therefore any concerns the officers may
have had for their safety should have dissipated. It was not necessary and exceeded the
permissible scope of detention, as the trial court concluded, for the officer to continue to
detain defendant for any questioning as the only possible reasonable fear the officers
entertained was not being able to view defendant's hands. Once the hands were visible,
further questioning was nothing more than a fishing expedition unsupported by any
remaining fear for officer safety and certainly not supported by any reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.
The State also contends that the trial court's note, "that the officers also ran a
warrant check on the name Defendant gave them, although the check would not reveal
any information that would establish Defendant's identity" was clearly erroneous. (R.
52). The record does not support this contention. The exchange between the State and
Officer Robinson on this point during direct examination was as follows:
Q. He gave you that name, what did you do with that information?
A. I also asked — he gave the date of birth of December 4th, '61. I ran the
warrants and an NCI check on that individual.
Q. Was he in custody when you did that?
A. He was not.
Q. Goon.
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A. When he gave that name, I overheard my — the person who I had in
custody, Monique Young, whisper to another officefr] who was assisting
me, stating that was not his name, that his name was Tracy Valdez. I then
advised to dispatch to check Tracy Valdez with the date of birth that he
gave me. They came back with a valid cstatewide warrant for Tracy Valdez
with a different date of birth of 12-3 of 61 instead of 12-4 of '61.
(R. 71:7, 8).
It seems clear and reasonably likely based on this testimony, that of Officer
Robinson stating that he ran the warrants and NCI check on the individual with the
December 4th, '61 birth rate and stating he then advised to dispatch to check Tracy Valdez
after hearing Ms. Young whisper to the other officer, that two warrants checks were
performed and/or requested. The trial court's note that the officers ran a warrant check
that would not reveal any information that would establish Defendant's identity is likely
correct. At the worst the testimony is somewhat ambiguous regarding whether two
warrants checks were requested and but suggests the reasonable inference the court made
that this was the case and therefore this finding, if was in fact a pertinent one, was not
"clear error" and therefore should not be disturbed on appeal.
The State also cites cases attempting to support their proposition that the officer's
questioning defendant about his name, identification, etc. is an inherent part of an officer
safety investigative detention. These cases carry little if any precedential value and/or
can be factually distinguished from the case at bar in that many of them involved
defendants who were being investigated for criminal activity or that involved actual
reports or some evidence that the defendants were armed and dangerous previous to any
initiated Terry stop.
Additionally, the citation to LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment S. 9.5(g)(3rd ed. 1996) is unpersuasive because it concerns the situations
where an individual is suspected of committing a crime or crimes and his identification
10

could prove useful if more evidence becomes available implicating him as the perpetrator
of that or a similar crime. In the case at hand the defendant was not a suspect in any
crime nor was there nor does the State claim there was any reasonable suspicion that he
had committed or was about to commit a crime. This was not an ongoing investigation of
any crime, but rather what should have been at worst no more than a momentary
inconvenience for the defendant to show his hands.
Similarly, the Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15 which reads "A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions," is not probative
because there was no reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in or going to be
engaged in any public offense, and the officers and defendant were not in a private
residence not a public place.
This case should also be distinguished from Michigan v. Summers. 452 U.S. 692,
101 S.Ct. 2587 (1981), where the Court held that a search warrant for a house carries
with it the authority to detain its occupants until the search is completed because in this
case the officers were not executing a search warrant but rather an arrest warrant. Their
entry into the home was not necessary and they had aheady effected the arrest warrant by
arresting the wanted individual who was cooperative. Therefore there was not need to
disturb defendant's sleep or to obtain his name/identification because the officers had
already effected the warrant they had set out to execute.

11

POINT III
IF NECESSARY THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT AN
ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
EXISTS LN THAT THE INITIATION OF A LEVEL TWO ENCOUNTER WITH
DEFENDANT WAS NOT A JUSTIFIED OFFICER SAFETY EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Defendant urges this court to review and if necessary as an alternative basis for
affirming the trial court's roling below, to find that the level two detention initiated by
Officer Robinson was not justified under an officer safety exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement or constitutionally permissible under any other
exception. This court has the authority to "affirm on any ground presented to the trial
court." State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant argued below
through his counsel in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
to Suppress and during the suppression hearing that Officer's Robinson's actions of
initiating a level two encounter could not be justified under any exception to the warrant
requirement. (R. 38; 72).
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme
Court "established a narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement that police
obtain a warrant for all searches. Where a police officer validly stops an individual for
investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and
dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover
weapons that might be used against him." State v Warren, 2001 UT App 346, \\Z , 37 P.3d 270
(quoting State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985)). Further, "the State must present
articulable facts that would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude that the suspect may
be armed" and ' "a mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient." ' Warren. 2001
UT App. at 1J14 (quoting Carter. 707 P.2d at 659).
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The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized two basic scenarios that may warrant a Terry
frisk. In thefirstscenario "facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or factual
context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed, such as a suspect with
a bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he
is armed and aggressively approaches the officer immediately upon being stopped." Id. at \\5.
In the second scenario, "it is not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the crime being investigated that leads to the
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed." Id. at \\5. Elaborating, the Court
recognized that crimes such as robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide,
and dealing in large quantities of drugs are by their nature suggestive of the presence of
weapons, but that for other types of crimes such as possession of marijuana, illegal
possession of liquor, minor assaults without weapons, underage drinking, driving under
the influence and lesser traffic offenses "there must be particular facts which lead the
officer to believe that a suspect is armed." Id at \ 15. (emphasis added).
In the case at hand there was nothing "inherent in the nature of the crime being
investigated that would lead to reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed" for
there was no crime being investigated and no suspect to investigate. Rather, officers had
simply executed an arrest warrant for a third party and were present with her while she
retrieved one item of clothing.
Additionally, in the case at hand there were not sufficient "articulable facts that
would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed."
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 1fl4 (quoting Carter 707 P.2d at 659). The officers went to
the home to effect an arrest warrant of another individual. (R. 71: 5). After having
arrested said individual without any apparent problems, two officers accompanied her to
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a bedroom for her to retrieve some pants. (R. 71: 6, 7). In the room they found the
defendant they found on the bed and assumed by Officer Robinson to be sleeping. (R.
71: 15, 16). The officer's only apparent concern was not being able to see defendant's
hands because they were covered by his body or by a blanket or a coat. (R. 71: 15).
Rather than allowing the defendant to peacefully sleep during the presumably minute or
two it would have taken for the cooperative arrested individual to retrieve her pants, even
with two officers present, one to watch each individual, the officer decided to likely
prolong the time in the room by waking the defendant to see his hands. There was
nothing about the defendant other than his presence and his sleeping with his arms under
blankets or a coat that would have raised any reasonable suspicion that he was armed and
dangerous. These circumstances coupled with the fact that the defendant was not being
investigated for any crime and was not in public but sleeping in a private residence
support the argument that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicions that
defendant was presently aimed and dangerous sufficient to justify initiating a level two
detention.
Therefore, Defendant urges this court to find that the officers lacked justification
to detain him under the circumstances and to affirm the decision of the trial court on this
alternative ground if necessary.2

2

The State also asserts that even if the officers unreasonably believed defendant to be armed
and dangerous, that the request for defendant's name was a justifiable minimal intrusion. The
argument lacks merit in this case because the trial court found, and it is not challenged here, that
defendant was subjected to a level two detention which must necessarily be supported by either
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or other justification. If the officer safety justification is not
applicable, there is no justification for the level two detention and therefore defendant's Fourth
Amendments rights were violated at the inception of the level two detention.
14

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant asks that this Court affirm the decision of the
trial court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against him because either
the police exceeded the scope of their permissible seizure of him without legal
justification or that the officers lacked legal justification for initiating a level two
detention of him.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2002 .
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FILED
Fourth Judical District Court
of Jtan County. State of Utah
7 Sl-<-

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTUOUKT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I -S^

Deputy

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
RULING
v.
Case No. 011400986

TRACY MANUEL VALDEZ,

Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being
fully advised in the premises, issues the following:
RULING
On February 26, 2001, Officer Bryan Robinson went to the home of Monique Young in
Pleasant Grove with a valid warrant for her arrest. She answered the door wearing boxer shorts
and asked to put on a pair of pants. The officer agreed and escorted her back to the bedroom.
There the officer noticed a male lying face down on the bed. The man was evidently asleep
because Officer Robinson had to shake him and yell at him for the man to wake up. Officer
Robinson was concerned that he could not see the man's hands. After the man awoke, Officer
Robinson asked him for his identification, which the man stated he did not have. The officer then
asked the man for his name and birth date. The man responded with the name of Sean Tracy
Michaels. Officer Robinson ran a warrants and an NCI check on that name. Officer Robinson
had also overheard Monique Young whispering to the assisting officer after the Defendant had
given the name of Sean Tracy Michaels that the man's true name was Tracy Valdez. Officer
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Robinson ran a warrants check on that name as well. The warrants checks turned up a valid
warrant for Tracy Valdez. A search incident to arrest turned up methamphetamine on the person
of the Defendant.
Defendant argues that this situation is similar to the one faced by the passenger-defendant
in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). In Johnson, an oflBcer pulled over a car with
faulty brake lights. The officer noticed that the name on license was not that of the registered
owner. Suspecting the car might be stolen, the officer asked for the name and birth date of the
passenger and then ran a warrants check on the driver and passenger. The Court ruled that
the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a
warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'"
Id. at 764.
The State here argues that this case is distinguishable in that Johnson was a level two stop
and the current Defendant was only subjected to a level one encounter until reasonable suspicion
to detain him had arisen. This Court disagrees.
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters
between law enforcement officers and the public:
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an 'articulable suspicion1 that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop1; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed."
A level one encounter "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." State v. Jackson,
805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); accord Bean. 869 P.2d at 986 ("'[A]
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police
officer merely approaches an individual on the strefct and questions him, if the
person is willing to listen.'") (citation omitted). "As long as the person 'remains free
to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some
particularized and objective justification.'"
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With a level two stop, however, the person is seized for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, "when the officer '"by means of physical force or show of
authority has in some way restrained the liberty"1 of a person." Hence, a level one
encounter becomes a level two stop and "a seizure under the fourth amendment
occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe
he or she is not free to leave." This is true "even if the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention brief."
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."
Salt Lake City v. Rav. 998 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000) (citations omitted).
In the present case, the officers had exceeded a level one encounter before the questioning
began. The testimony was that the Defendant was shouted at and physically shaken by an officer
before any questioning began. The encounter occurred not on a public street but in a private
bedroom with two officers present. The officers already had someone in custody. A reasonable
person in that situation would not have felt at liberty to disregard the officer's question or walk
away.
After the officers could see Defendants hands and new they were in no danger, the
detention should have ended.
The length and scope of the detention must be '"strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1991). While Monique Young's statement may have
given rise to an articulable suspicion that Defendant had given the officers false information, the
Defendant had already been improperly detained at that point. It is worthy of note that the
officers also ran a warrant check on the name Defendant gave them, although the check would
not reveal any information that would establish Defendant's identity.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that:
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.

DATED this

dav of Julv, 2001
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THE COURT:

We are back on the record now on the

preliminary hearing on the case of State of Utah vs. Tracy
Manuel Valdez, case No. 001400986.
Is the State prepared to proceed?
MR. BUHMAN:

We are, Your Honor.

We'd call Officer

Robinson.
THE COURT:

Tracy Valdez is present.

is here in his behalf.
MR. GALE:

Richard Gale

Call your first witness.

Judge, we'd move to exclude any witnesses

who are going to testify who are in the courtroom at this
time.
MR. BUHMAN:
THE COURT:

He's the only one.
Okay.

BRYAN ROBINSON
called by the Plaintiff, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I do.
Be seated to my left.
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Respond to

cuestions fror^ counsel.

You may proceed.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

Officer, please state your name and spell your last

name.
A.

Bryan J. Robinson, R-0-B-I-N-S-O-N.

Q.

And back in February of this year, by whom were you

employed?
A.

Pleasant Grove Department of Public Safety.

Q.

As a police officer?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And on that date, February 2 6th, did you respond to

a home on Thornberry Avenue in Pleasant Grove to affect an
arrest warrant?
A.

I did.

Q.

Describe what happened, please?

A.

I went there to arrest Monique Young.

valid warrant out of our city.

I knocked on the door.

could hear people in there in the house.
before they answered the door.

She had a
We

It was sometime

Finally the door was opened.

Monique Young, who I knew to be Monique Young, answered the
door.

I advised her that she had a warrant for her arrest

and advised her she was under arrest.
Q.

What happened?
Utah State Courts
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A.

She had, like, some boxer type shorts, or some

shorts on.
pants.

She requested that she be allowed to put on some

I allowed her to do that.

her bedroom.

She said they were back in

I escorted her back to her bedroom where there

was a male individual laying on a bed face down.
Q.

Why did you escort her back to the bedroom?

A.

Custody, personal safety reasons.

arrest.

She was under

I wasn't going to allow her to leave my sight.

Q.

You already told her she was under arrest?

A.

I advised she was under arrest.

Q.

You went back to a bedroom and you say you saw a

male on the bed?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Describe what you saw?

A.

There was a male laying face down.

I can T t remember

if it was a coat or blankets that were over him.
see his hands.

That was a concern for me.

him, you know, "Wake up.
responsive.
"Wake up.

I couldn't

So I yelled at

Let me see your hands."

He wasn't

I remember shaking him and shaking the bed.
I need to see your hands."

At that point he kind

of gets up and wakes up I would say.
Q.

Did you place him into custody?

A.

Not at that time.

Q.

Who was that male?

A.

I asked him if he had any identification on him.
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seated that he did not.

I asked him fcr his name.

He gave

the name of Sean Tracy Michaels.
Q.

Sean Tracy Michaels?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Is that person here in the courtroom today who

identified himself with that name?
A.

He is.

Q.

Would you identify him?

A.

He is the defendant in the green shirt.
MR. BUHMAN:

Your Honor, may the record reflect that

he identified Mr. Valdez?
THE COURT:

It may.

BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

He gave you that name, what did you do with that

information?
A.

I also asked - - h e gave the date of birth of

December 4th, '61.

I ran the warrants and an NCI check on

that individual.
Q.

Was he in custody when you did that?

A.

He was not.

Q.

Go on.

A.

When he gave that name, I overheard my -- the person

who I had in custody, Monique Young, whisper to another
office who was assisting me, stating that was not his name,
that his name was Tracy Valdez.

I then advised to dispatch
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to check Tracy Valdez with the date of birth that he gave rr.e.
They came back with a valid statewide warrant for Tracy
Valdez with a different date of birth of 12-3 of •61 instead
of 12-4 of '61.
Q.

Go on.

A.

At that point I asked the defendant if he had any

identification.

At that point he produced a Utah

identification card from his right rear pocket.

The name on

the card was Tracy Manuel Valdez with a date of birth of 12-3
of '61.
Q.

You said that under the name on the identification

card there was a valid statewide warrant?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And so what did you do?

A.

I then placed him under arrest for the valid

statewide warrant, and for false personal information.
Q.

Go on.

A.

I secured him in handcuffs.

I led him out to my

patrol vehicle, while the other officer led out the other in
custody out to his patrol vehicle.
weapons.

I patted him down for

I searched his person, lifted up his shirt.

a big black trench coat on.

He had

I removed that to make sure that

it didn't have any weapons in it or items of contraband.

In

his belt, on the right side of his belt he had several small
plastic baggies in his possession.

They were kind of hidden
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his belt.
MR. BUHMAN:

May I approach the witness?

THE COURT:

You may.

BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

I'm handing you a plastic baggy marked State's

Exhibit No. 1.
A.

What is that?

These are the bags that were in his waistband or

belt.
Q.

In your experience, what are those baggies used for?

A.

They usually contain items of contraband, controlled

substances, methamphetamine, marijuana, various items like
that.
MR. BUHMAN:

Move to admit Exhibit No. 1.

THE COURT: "Any objection, Counsel, for the purpose
of this hearing?
MR. GALE:

No objection.

THE COURT:

They may be received.

Thank you.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 was received into
evidence.)
MR. BUHMAN:

Go ahead and pass that up to the Judge.

BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

Officer Robinson, did you continue searching him?

A.

I did.

I noticed there was on his zipper, fastened

to his zipper on his pants, fastened to a chain
Q.

A fly zipper?
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A.

Yes.

There was like a metal vial, like - -

him what was in it.

iI

asked

He said it was medicine, pill s.
From his zi pper, there was a chain?

Q.

Let me back up.

A.

I have something similar to it if that wi.11 help.

It' s lil<.e one; of those type of things, but it was much
bigger, and i.t was fastened like with a key chain to his
zipper on his pants.
Q.

So there's a metal vial with a chain attached to the

|

zipper; is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And did you search that container?

A.

I did.

Q.

What did you find?

A.

There was a white crystal substance in it that --

that was in it.

It later field tested positive for

methamphetamine.
Q.

Officer, we spoke earlier.

You indicated that that

substance is not here in the courtroom today.

Do you know

where it is?
A.

It's at the Utah State Crime Lab.

Q.

It's still at the Crime Lab?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Did you send that up for testing?

A.

I did.
MR. BUHMAN:

|
May I approach?
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THE COURT:

You may.

BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

This is State's No. 2, a document.

Is that the

results from the Crime Lab's test of what you sent up in thar
vial?
A.

It is.

Q.

And what are the results of that test?

A.

On the second page it states that item one

methamphetamine was identified in the white crystal residue
in the metal tube.
MR. BUHMAN:
THE COURT:

Move to admit Exhibit No. 2.
Any objection, Counselor, for the

purpose of this hearing?
MR. GALE:
THE COURT:

No objection.
It may be received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 was received into
evidence.)
BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

And the place where this arrest occurred, did it

occur within a thousand feet of any day care centers?
A.

It did.

Q.

Which day care center?

A.

I'm not sure the name.

It's kind of part of the

complex, that Thornberry Apartments.

There's several

apartment buildings and it's adjacent in the same parking lot
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as the Thornberry Apartments.
Q.

Easily within a thousand feet?

A.

Easily.

Q.

Is there also a post office there?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Within a thousand feet?

A.

Easily.

Q.

Is there public parking at that post office?

A.

There is.
MR. BUHMAN:

Your Honor, for the purpose of today's

hearing, I had the -- I don't know her last name.

I had

Sharon -THE COURT:
MR. BUHMAN:

Sharon Jones.
-- print off two prior convictions.

These are just the minutes.
judgments.

We don't have the certified

We're asking the Court to consider these for

today's hearing.

May I approach so Your Honor can examine

them?
THE COURT:
MR. BUHMAN:
THE COURT:
MR. BUHMAN:
research.

Let Counsel examine them first of all.
He has, Your Honor.
Very well.
One of them we will need to do further

Do you want me to mark them, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

I would think so, if you're going to

rely on them having been previously convicted of unlawful
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possession or use of a controlled substance.
(Counsel confer off the record.)
MR. BUHMAN:

Your Honor, this is State's Exhibit

No. 3, which I proffer shows a conviction for possession,
distribution of a controlled substance wilchin a thousand feet
of a school or public place, a third degree felony.

THE COURT:
MR. GALE:

Any objection, Counsel?
No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

For the purposes of this hearing, it may

be received.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 was received into
evidence.)
MR. BUHMAN:

Your Honor, just for -- I don't mean to

make any argument at this point, but because the drugs are at
the crime laboratory, if there were an issue of admissibility
today or the weight of the evidence, for that particular item
we would move for a continuance to admit those as evidence in
the preliminary hearing pursuant to Rule 1102 of the Rules of
Evidence.
MR. GALE:
THE COURT:

I have no objection, Judge.
Okay.

You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GALE:
Q.

Officer Robinson, you said that you went to the
Utah State Courts
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apartment in Pleasant Grove to a r r e s t Monique Young; i s chat
right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

You knew that Monique Young was at that apartment?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And when you knocked on the door, -#wn you said you

heard some noise inside the apartment; is that right?
A.

There was people -- you could tell there was people

walking around in there.

You knew that there was somebody in

there.
Q.

So you knew somebody was in there, and then Monique

Young actually answered the door; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

At that time you knew she was Monique Young?

A.

Correct.

Q.

You told her that she was under arrest and that you

were going to take her to jail, didn't you?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And at that point she asked if she could put on some

pants over her shorts; is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

At that point you had completed the purpose for

which you had gone to the apartment, hadn't you?
A.

To arrest Monique Young, yes.

Q.

And so your only purpose going back any further into
Utah State Courts

1 I the apartment was to get pants for her; is that correct?
A.

I wasn't the one getting the pants for her.

I was

allowing her to go back there to get the pants and I escorted
her back there.
Q.

That was the only reason you went back there; is

that right?
A.

It's for my officer safety, and to allow her to go

back and get the pants.

Yes, that's the only reason I went

back.
Q.

So when you went back there into the room to get the

pants, you said that you saw a male laying face down on the
bed; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And that male, you testified that you had to yell at

him and sort of shake him to wake him up?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So this person was actually asleep when you got in

the room, wasn't he?
A.

I would assume so.

Q.

And so since this person was asleep, while he was

asleep, he certainly didn't pose any kind of threat to
officer safety?
A.

I couldn't see his hands.

His hands were concealed

either by his body or by a blanket or by a coat.
see his hands.
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Q.

But you thought he was asleep, didn't you?

A.

I would assume, yeah.

Q.

And certainly he didn't do anything that was

suspicious at that point, did he?
A.

It took quite a bit to get him awake.

I became more

suspicious that he would be feigning that he was actually
asleep and just was laying there face down hoping I'd go
away.
Q.

So the only suspicious thing was that he wouldn't

wake up, not anything else?
A.

And that I couldn't see his hands.

Q.

You couldn't see his hands because they were under a

coat or blanket or something on the bed?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then it was after you woke this individual up

that you asked for ID and for the individual's name; is that
right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And it was after you asked -- after you asked the

question of what his name was and asked for ID that Monique
whispered that his name was Tracy Valdez; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So you didn't suspect him of giving any false

information until after you had already asked him what his
name was and for his ID; is that right?
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A.

Before that point, no, I did not.

Q.

Now, after you found out what his name was, you said

that you did a Terry frisk for weapons; is that right?
A.

I don't know if I testified to that.

I can't

remember if I frisked him in the apartment or not.

Is that

what you are asking?
Q.

Yes.

At some point after you found out his name,

you performed a frisk; is that right?
A.

After he was in custody.

I know for sure that I did

frisk him,
Q.

At that point you were frisking him to determine

whether he had any weapons?
A.

Correct.

He was in custody at that time.

Q.

And so you -- when you were frisking him to see if

he had any weapons, then you saw these plastic bags on his
belt; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

You knew those weren't weapons; correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And then you saw these little vials on his zipper

chain; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, you said you have a little vial there, you said

this vial was a little bigger than yours?
A.

His vial was a little bigger than the one that I
Utah State Courts
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1 I have.
Q.

How much bigger was his vial?

A.

This is, what, probably a quarter inch in diameter.

I'd say his is closer to maybe a half inch in diameter.
Q.

A half inch in diameter, how long?

A.

Probably the same length, about an inch, inch and a

half, two inches.
Q.

Now, you didn't suspect that that vial had weapons

or anything in it, did you?
A.

No.
MR. GALE:

I don't have anything further, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. BUHMAN:

Any redirect?
Just briefly.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUHMAN:
Q.

When you entered the apartment, you saw Mr. Valdez

asleep on the bed.

Did you know that he was asleep?

A.

No, I did not know that he was asleep.

Q.

Do you recall approximately what time of night it

A.

It was in the day time.

was?
It was the middle of the

day.
Q.

That's all right.

Did you ask for his
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identification first or just ask for his name first?
A.

I asked if he had any ID first.

Q.

Did you do anything to place him in custody at that

time?
A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you frisk him at that point?

A.

Not that I remember.

Q.

Did you tell him he was under arrest?

A.

Did not.

Q.

You indicated earlier that you searched his belt

area and you found baggies and a vial.

Did that occur before

or after you arrested him?
A.

It was after he was arrested and taken from the

bedroom down to my patrol vehicle.
MR. BUHMAN:

Thank you.

THE COURT:
MR. GALE:

Mr. Gale, any further questions?
No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Very well.

You may step down.

State rest?
MR. BUHMAN:
evidence.

If I didn't, I'd move to admit all my

If I haven't, I'd move to admit them and I rest.
THE COURT:

I think you already have, Counsel, and

there's - - a t least for the purposes of this hearing, there's
been no objection to the Court receiving State's Exhibits 1,
2 and 3.
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Mr. Gale?
MR. GALE:

Judge, I don't have anything.

advised Mr. Valdez of his right to testify.

I've

I believe he's

going to take my advice and not testify at today's hearing.
And so we'd just submit the case.
THE COURT:

I'm going to find that there is probably

cause that the offenses were committed, and probable cause
that Tracy Manuel Valdez committed the offenses.

Is he

prepared then to enter a plea, Counsel, to these charges, and
you can then set it for trial?
MR. GALE:

Judge, he'd enter a plea of not guilty at

this point.
THE COURT:

I'll show an entry of not guilty pleas

to all three charges.

How long will this take from the

State's perspective to hear?
MR. BUHMAN:
MR. GALE:

One day, Your Honor.
Judge, we anticipate a suppression --

filing a suppression motion, and having a -- possibly having
a hearing.

I guess I'm going to need to request the

transcript, look at the case law, and determine whether we'd
request a hearing or just submit it on the preliminary
hearing transcript.
THE COURT:

Do so within what period of time, 20

days?
MR. GALE:

That would be great, Judge.
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THE COURT:

Give the State ten day*s zc

Let's set the next hearing[.

respond.

Well, you don' t know whether

you're going to request a formal hearing.
MR. GALE:

Judge, why don't we set up a hearing.

Because even if I don't re quest a formal he aring, I would
like to argue it, even if we don't have an evidentiary
hearing.
MR. BUHMAN:

Are we going to have the transcript

that quickly?
(A discussion was; held off the record.)
THE COURT:

I'll give you 3 0 days, Counsel, and 10

days for the State t o respond.

Let's set it subsequent to

that time.
THE CLERK:
MR. BUHMAN:
THE CLERK:
MR. BUHMAN:
MR. GALE:
THE CLERK:
MR. GALE:
MR. BUHMAN:
THE COURT:

How about May 21st, 1: 30.
I'm scheduled to be in trial that day.
June 4th at 1:30.
Fine with me.
I'm going to be out of town that week.
June 11th.
I'm available then.
That's fine.
June 11th, 1:30.

Counsel, will you make

a motion to withdraw your exhibits?
MR. BUHMAN:
THE COURT:

I'll make the motion •
I'll grant you motion
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reflect that I'm providing back to Mr. Buhman Scale's
Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.
MR. GALE:
to address.

Thank you.

Judge, we have one other issue we'd like

Mr. Valdez previously, as you know, was given a

one year commitment and allowed work release after the first
three months.

On this case, I believe he has some bail, but

is not going to get out of custody.

What I would request,

Judge, is perhaps that rather than have this bail, that the
Court release him on this case so that he would be able to
get into work release when that's available for him.
Judge, he's going to -- as you know, he's going to
be held for the next nine months, at least.

I don't know if

it was even three months ago that he was given the one year
commitment.
THE COURT:

Let's revisit it when the time arrives.

I don't think it's ripe at this point in time.
MR. GALE:

Judge, I think he has a month and a half,

and he needs to get on to the waiting list to get into work
release.

They won't even do that until he is -- he's able

for work release.

So he's not - - a t this point because he's

being held on this case with the bail, he's not even able to
put his name on the waiting list.
THE COURT:

But didn't I allowed on the one year

commitment the last ninety days he could go
MR. GALE:

After the first ninety days you allowed
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1

him --he could go into work release.

2

probably a month ago or so.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BUHMAN:

5

case.

6

the jail?

I believe that was

State want to be heard?
I'm not very familiar with the other

In this case -- has he received any drug treatment in

THE DEFENDANT:

7

I'm in the kitchen.

I signed up for

8

the drug treatment, but they won't let me go through that

9

unless I'm court ordered because all the court ordered people

10

they have to shove them through.
THE COURT:

11
12
13
14

But the other case is a sexual case, as

I -- contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
MR. GALE:

It's a Class A misdemeanor.

what the term is.

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

20

It wasn't a sexual case.

Distribution of sexually explicit

material to a minor.
MR. GALE:

18
19

Where one of his kids had access to a

magazine,
MR. BUHMAN:

I believe there's also two warrants

21

that are still outstanding.

22

MR. GALE:

23

I forgot

That's what they said today.

If they are, Judge, I think those are

misdemeanor warrants, like Pleasant Grove --

24

MR. BUHMAN:

25

one is out of Sandy.

One's a Judge Backlund and the_ other
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